Explaining the content of impact assessment in the United Kingdom: Learning across time, sectors, and departments by Fritsch, O et al.
This is a repository copy of Explaining the content of impact assessment in the United 
Kingdom: Learning across time, sectors, and departments.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/102975/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Fritsch, O, Kamkhaji, JC and Radaelli, CM (2017) Explaining the content of impact 
assessment in the United Kingdom: Learning across time, sectors, and departments. 
Regulation & Governance, 11 (4). pp. 325-342. ISSN 1748-5983 
https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12129
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd. This is the peer reviewed version of the following
article: Fritsch, O, Kamkhaji, JC and Radaelli, CM (2017) Explaining the content of impact 
assessment in the United Kingdom: Learning across time, sectors, and departments. 
Regulation & Governance, 11: 325–342, which has been published in final form at 
https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12129. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes 
in accordance with the Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
1 
 
THE CONTENT OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM:                
EXPLORING LEARNING ACROSS TIME, SECTORS AND DEPARTMENTS 
 
Oliver Fritsch (University of Leeds, o.fritsch@leeds.ac.uk) 
Jonathan C. Kamkhaji (University of Exeter) 
Claudio M. Radaelli (University of Exeter) 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
Whilst several studies have documented how evidence-based policy instruments affect 
public policy, we know less about what causes changes over time in the analyses mandated 
by the instruments, especially in Britain. Thus, we take the analytical content of a pivotal 
regulatory reform instrument (impact assessment) as dependent variable, we draw on 
learning as conceptual framework, and we explain the dynamics of learning processes 
across departments, policy sectors, and time. Empirically, our study draws on sample of 517 
impact assessments produced in Britain (2005-2011). Experience and capacity in 
different departments matter in learning processes. Guidelines matter too, but 
moderately. Departments specialize in their core policy sectors when performing 
regulatory analysis, but some have greater analytical capacity overall. Peripheral 
departments invest more in impact assessment than core executive departments. 
The presence of a regulatory oversight body enhances the learning process. 
Elections have different effects, depending on the context in which they are 
contested. These findings contribute to the literature on regulation, policy learning 
and policy instruments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the vast literature on policy instruments, Impact Assessment (IA) has a special 
place as a pivotal instrument in regulatory reform (Dunlop and Radaelli 2016a). IA is 
a tool to appraise the effects of proposed primary and/or secondary legislation. It 
has been adopted over the last 35 years by many OECD and EU member states 
(Radaelli 2005; OECD 2009; De Francesco 2012) and, increasingly so, developing 
countries (Adelle et al. 2016). 
 
For social scientists, this regulatory policy instrument features prominently on two 
distinct, but not necessarily contradictory, political agendas: it is, on the one hand, a 
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manifestation of the evidence-based policy making movement (Nutley, Walter and 
Daviers 2007; Cairney 2015); or, if we want to take the long view, an episode in the 
struggle to bring rationality and science to bear on public policy (Carley 1980; 
McGarity 1991; Boswell 2008; Carroll 2010; Desmarais and Hird 2014). On the other 
hand, it is about controlling the bureaucracy, as shown by the literature on 
administrative procedure (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987; Carpenter and 
Gubb 2014; Damonte, Dunlop and Radaelli 2014). In both strands of the literature, 
IA plays the role of an independent variable with causal effects in terms of political 
control and knowledge utilization. 
 
We take a different perspective and start from the content of IA as a dependent 
variable. In doing so, we contribute to an emerging literature that has measured the 
content of IA and addressed the question of whether regulators comply with 
statutory guidelines and international best practice (Cecot et al. 2008; Staronová 
2010; Shapiro and Morrall 2012; Ellig, McLaughlin and Morrall 2013).  
 
We analyze a sample of 517 IAs produced in the UK between 2005 and 2011. Our 
contribution to the comparative literature on policy instruments is substantive  W 
because we explain variation across time, sectors and departments; conceptual  W 
because we draw on a theoretical lens on the policy process, that is, learning; and 
methodological  W because we provide a template of how a large-N dataset of IAs 
can be assembled, coded, and analyzed.  
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We proceed as follows. First we briefly introduce the literature and, in another 
section, the UK context. This is followed by a description of our dataset, coding 
technique and dependent variable. We then discuss theory, starting from a simple 
proposition about time. Further, we add a level of sophistication, by testing 
whether (a) the basic trend is mitigated or interrupted by statutory guidelines, 
regulatory oversight, and election years; (b) departments intensify regulatory 
analysis of costs and benefits affecting the policy sectors they specialize in; and (c) 
IA is sensitive to whether a department belongs to the core executive or not. We 
finally discuss our results and their contribution to the literature. 
 
LITERATURE 
 
The studies on the analytics of IA have often stop at simple compliance tests: do 
regulators comply with the statutory guidelines on regulatory analysis or not, could 
benefit-cost calculations be carried out more effectively by agencies (for the US, see 
Hahn and Tetlock 2008; Belcore and Ellig 2008; Ellig and McLaughlin 2012; Fraas 
and Lutter 2013; and for the European Commission, see Cecot et al. 2008 and 
Renda 2011). The approach features also in Fritsch et al. (2013) on the UK and 
Staronová (2010) on four central and eastern European countries. Others have 
looked at the content of IAs from a different angle, that is, whether they assist in 
meeting the goal of mainstreaming some key dimensions like gender, fundamental 
rights, and so on (on the EU, see Smismans and Minto 2016). These studies, albeit 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ ?  “ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ Ă ƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐ ƉŽŝŶƚ ĨŽƌ ĂŶĂůǇǌŝŶŐĂ ǀĂƌŝĞƚǇ ŽĨ ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŵŝŐŚƚ
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influence the quality of regulatory analysis, such as the nature of the regulation, 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞŵĂŶĚĂƚĞƐ ?ŽƌĚĞĂĚůŝŶĞƐ ? ?Ellig and McLaughlin 2012, 863).  
 
Essentially, in the literature these factors are examined from three angles. First, the 
diffusion perspective (De Francesco 2012; Wiener 2007; Peci and Sobral 2011) 
sheds light on the interaction between international organizations and adopting 
countries. We do not borrow from this literature. The UK is a pioneer country in 
regulatory analysis. Together with the US, it is an exporter, not an importer of IA. 
 
Second, quantitative work carried out in the US focuses on single causes rather than 
a range of hypotheses. For instance, Shapiro and Morrall (2012) examine 109 IAs to 
test the hypothesis that the quality of analysis reflects the economic significance of 
a regulatory proposal. Analysing 111 IAs, Ellig, McLaughlin and Morrall (2013) 
isolate the effects of midnight regulations and ideological differences between 
government and regulators. Shapiro and Morrall (2013) explore the relationship 
between time spent on regulatory oversight and quality of analysis. 
 
Third, the literature on environmental impact assessment is another source of 
inspiration (e.g., Tzoumis and Finegold 2000; Gray and Edward-Jones 2003; Tzoumis 
2007; Pinho, Rodrigo and Monterrosso 2007; Landim and Sánchez 2012; Kabir and 
Momtaz 2014). Providing evidence on countries as diverse as Bangladesh, Brazil, 
Portugal, the UK and the US, this scholarship provides in-depth analyses of trends 
over time and across departments, and identifies variables that explain content, 
such as legislation, guidance documents, agency age and experience, staff turnover, 
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and time spent on appraisal. Studies of individual jurisdictions dominate (but see 
Canelas et al. 2005 for a comparative project). 
 
We draw three preliminary conclusions. On the one hand, the content of IA has 
been studied in various contexts, but this strand of research is often descriptive or 
associated with one or two variables only. On the other, IA studies usually rely on 
rather small datasets or qualitative research. Finally, research on environmental 
impact assessment has identified a number of causal factors that should be tested 
beyond the field of environmental and sustainability appraisal. We proceed from 
these findings and try to overcome the limitations in the literature by creating a 
new dataset and by properly testing six factors that may affect the content of 
regulatory analysis. 
 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE UK 
 
IA is a mandatory step in the UK policy formulation process, covering both primary 
and secondary legislation (of regulatory nature or not; hence we use IA rather than 
RIA). While the bulk of analyses performed within IA since the 1980s focused mainly 
on administrative burdens for businesses, more recent statutory guidelines have 
expanded the scope of IA, thereby including further analyses relating to 
competitiveness and the position of small and medium enterprises, environment 
and sustainability tests, and tests on public health, social welfare and vulnerable 
societal groups (Cabinet Office 2003; Department for Business Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform 2007). In recent years, the production and scrutiny of IA has 
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ďĞĞŶŬĞǇƚŽĚĞůŝǀĞƌŽŶƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŵĂũŽƌƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇƉŽůŝĐǇƚĂƌŐĞƚ: to reduce 
the impact of regulation on business. This was done, first, through  ‘ŽŶĞ-in-one-out ?, 
an initiative which required departments to accompany proposed new regulations 
with deregulatory measures of the same net cost (HM Government 2011) ? ‘KŶĞ-in-
two-ŽƵƚ ?, adopted in 2015, takes this objective even further, obliging regulators to 
offset every pound of cost imposed through new regulation with deregulatory 
measures worth twice as much (Department for Business Innovation and Skills 
2015; Lodge and Wegrich 2015). IAs then serve to find out if new regulations 
ĐŽŵƉůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚĂŶŶƵĂůŶĞƚĐŽƐƚƚŽďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?ĨŝŐƵƌĞƵƐĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ŽŶĞ-in-
two-ŽƵƚƚĂƌŐĞƚ ? ?
 
The UK has developed one of the most advanced IA systems in Europe (Hertin et al. 
2009; Renda 2011). Since 2009, the Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC), an advisory 
non-departmental public body, has scrutinized new regulatory and legislative 
proposals at the drafting stage and, if necessary, suggests modifications, additional 
tests or new data to IA officers (see Regulatory Policy Committee 2010). Its mission 
ŚĂƐ ǁŝĚĞŶĞĚ ƚŽ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚ / ǁŝƚŚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ůŝŬĞ  ‘ŽŶĞ-in-one-ŽƵƚ ? ĂŶĚ
ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ‘ŽŶĞ-in-two-ŽƵƚ ?(by checking claims made by departments about how new 
proposals met the one-in-one-out and, today, one-in-two out requirement). The 
RPC also features prominently on the government agenda because it validates the 
governmental estimates of costs and benefits arising out of new regulations 
(Gibbons and Parker 2012, 2013). 
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Turning to empirical research on the UK, Ambler, Chittenden and Xiao (2007) report 
on categories of costs and benefits, arguing that incomplete or inaccurate analysis 
result in heavier regulatory burdens for business. Fritsch et al. (2013) compare UK 
and EU IAs, concluding that the EU outperforms the UK when it comes to less 
orthodox tests in IA, such as environmental and social impacts. 
 
When we think of IA as a regulatory tool more broadly, the literature has for a long 
time centred on political control over regulators. Historically, this theme has 
revolved around the relationship between the Cabinet Office, Whitehall and the 
regulators. Both under Labour and in the Coalition government, Britain has 
witnessed an increase in the control capacity of the Cabinet Office (Dommett and 
Flinders 2015), seeking to reduce fragmentation and re-establishing control at the 
centre through the obligation to carry out reviews, evaluations and IAs of new 
legislation and regulation. Indeed, the unmitigated faith in IA goes back to the 
1990s, when a study on compliance cost assessment (Froud et al. 1998) 
demonstrated how the core executive tried to achieve its objective of de-regulation 
by exercising regulatory oversight via analytical tests on new regulations. 
 
There is of course a wealth of studies on regulation in the UK (Ogus 2001; Lodge and 
Wegrich 2009; Prosser 2010), yet we know little about the crucial moment in which 
regulation is appraised via IA (but see Russel and Jordan 2009 on IAs as levers in 
policy coordination for sustainable development). 
 
DATA, CODING AND DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
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This section describes our dataset, coding technique and our dependent variables. 
We follow the OECD convention of considering analytical richness, which refers to 
breadth and scope as key dimensions to differentiate IAs in terms of the 
information they provide (OECD 2009). Scope refers to the number of elements 
(e.g. problem definition, economic, environmental and social analysis, consultation) 
and breadth to how deep the analysis goes (e.g. benefit-cost identification, 
quantification, monetization, benefit-cost ratios, discount rates and sensitivity 
analysis). 
 
As mentioned, we built a sample of 517 IAs between 2005 and 2011. First, we 
established a database of all IAs produced by the UK central government in this 
period, leaving aside Scottish IAs which belong to a different system of regulatory 
oversight in Edinburgh. For 2005 to 2008 we perused government command papers 
on regulatory analysis, i.e. documents sent by the Cabinet Office to Parliament to 
inform about on-going legislative or regulatory activities. For IAs produced between 
2008 and 2011, we used the Impact Assessment Library published by the UK Better 
Regulation Executive. In total, the database lists more than 2,000 entries. In a 
second step, we extracted a stratified random sample of 517 IAs, representative 
across departments and time and proportionate to the productivity of departments 
in a given year. We then downloaded all IAs in our sample from departmental 
websites and the IA library or approached government departments via email in 
order to get hold of those documents.i 
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We relied on the scorecard approach (Hahn and Tetlock 2008; Shapiro and Morrall 
2012; Ellig, McLaughlin and Morrall 2013) to appraise whether IAs provide the 
information that they are supposed to convey. Taking government guidelines as a 
benchmark, we established a list of typical tests and analyses. The list includes 
varieties of economic tests, policy effects on the economy, health, labor and the 
environment, but also the definition of the policy problem, consultation, and issues 
related to implementation and monitoring. In total, our scorecard covers 79 items.ii 
Trained graduatĞ ĐŽĚĞƌƐ ƉŝůŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ? ƐƵƉĞƌǀŝƐŝŽŶ ? ǁŝƚŚ
checks on their reliability scores and additional advice. After this phase, the coders 
carried out the measurement in binary scale (0/1, absence or presence) for all 
scorecard items. We then measured again the reliability of coding and variance 
across the coders throughout the coding stage of our project. 
 
Note that the fact that a department reports in a given IA that a cost quantification 
has been carried out is all a researcher can code. Our coders could not answer the 
question whether the analysis rested on sound assumptions, solid figures and 
appropriate statistical techniques. In the end we can only check for compliance with 
the requirements set by the IA guidelines and international best practice. 
 
The previous discussion of the literature suggests that analytical richness is 
potentially influenced by different factors. We concentrate on the following six: 
experience, learning through guidelines, regulatory oversight, sectoral 
specialization, elections, and political priorities of the core executive. In order to 
test these causal claims, we created two indexes that work as dependent variables: 
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one that aggregates the information on all 79 guideline requirements and 
represents a proxy of the overall analytical richness; and one set of four sub-indexes 
which focus on specific guideline requirements and represent proxies of, 
respectively, completeness of benefit-cost measures, and economic, environmental 
and social analysis. We construct our main index in two steps: 
 
First, we perform a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to minimize redundant 
information, i.e. to reduce the number of manifest variables to a smaller set of 
components characterized by a simple structure and explaining a satisfactory 
degree of variability. The PCA results in 15 significant components explaining more 
than the 50 per cent of the overall variability observed in the sample. Second, we 
use the 15 principal components and their scores to construct a weighted index (for 
instance, Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006) which reads as follows:  
ܹ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ܫ݊݀݁ݔܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜ ൌ ෍ሺܿ݋݉݌݋݊݁݊ݐݏܿ݋ݎ݁௜௝   ?  ݒܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁ݔ݌݈ܽ݅݊݁݀௝ሻே௝ୀଵ  
whereby the subscript i indicates the observation and the subscript j the principal 
component (N=15). The index is a hierarchically weighted aggregate of the 15 
components. Because we are interested in variation, the components explaining 
major shares of variance in the data set carry a greater weight. Finally, we rescale 
the new scores on a 0-1 scale to make interpretation easier.iii 
 
We follow a similar rationale to construct the sub-indexes. Each sub-index measures 
one dimension of regulatory analysis only. To illustrate, sub-index 1 on benefit-cost 
measures is based on those principal components that aggregate variables dealing 
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with benefit-cost analysis, that is, components 1 and 2.iv Likewise, sub-index 2 on 
economic impacts aggregates only those principal components that cluster 
scorecard variables related to impacts on business, trade, GDP, and competitiveness 
(namely components 4, 7, 11 and 13). Finally, sub-indexes 3 and 4 on the analytical 
richness of social and environmental analyses brought together, respectively, the 
components related to social impacts (5, 8, 12 and 15) and those related to impacts 
on the natural environment (6 and 9).  
 
In the following, we use those weighted indexes - proxies of analytical richness of IA 
in general and in specific dimensions of analysis - as dependent variables, enabling 
us to put the above hypotheses to an empirical test. 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES 
 
We perform tests on variation across departments and over time by keeping the 
institutional context constant  W one advantage of considering a single country. 
Essentially, we start with the baseline analysis of whether compliance with the 
requirements increases over time. We then consider the different variables that 
may alter or disrupt this process. 
 
Hypotheses 1: learning through experience 
 
To begin with, we draw on Kelman (2005). This author documented that change has 
a mundane, ordinary yet by no means trivial, characteristic: by simply doing 
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 ‘ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŶĞǁ ? ?ƉƵďůŝĐŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐƐŚŽǁƚŽŽƚŚĞƌŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐƚŚĂƚĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ
or operation is feasible and can be carried out without too many impediments. 
Once we enter a new procedure in public administration and that procedure starts 
being used, experience plays an important role in the implementation process. We 
do not simply look at the passing of time (like in Fritsch et al. 2013). Instead, it is the 
accumulated experience in doing IA within a specific time frame that may be a 
cause for change. Alternatively, experience may be brought in externally through 
the appointment of new talent, and it may also be a result of intra-departmental 
specialization and selection, if authors of excellent IA are asked to work on other IAs 
in the future. We cannot possibly test those three mechanisms, not the least 
because we are likely to observe them at the same time. However, what all three 
mechanisms  W learning by doing, new hires, intradepartmental selection  W have in 
common is that they occur in response to  ‘numberƐ ?: officers learn more as they 
prepare more IAs. Departments are more likely to recruit new talent as the 
workload associated with IA preparation increases. Departments are more likely to 
allocate responsibilities to specialist authors within their institution as the number 
of IAs on their desks and need for special skills increases. This idea lies at the heart 
of hypothesis 1 which stipulates that the analytical richness of IA depends on the 
number of IAs prepared previously in a department: 
 
H1: The more IAs a department produces, the better the department becomes in 
regulatory analysis. 
 
Hypotheses 2 and 3: learning through experience ʹ variations 
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H2 through H6 are in different ways variations in the mechanism underlying the first 
hypothesis, especially and most directly H2 and H3. Hence we deal with H2 and H3 
together. Learning is facilitated, or hindered, by various political and organizational 
factors. We explore two of them. One is the introduction of new statutory 
guidelines on IA. More specific instructions should generate improvement in 
compliance (Hypothesis 2). Second, if the government creates a regulatory oversight 
body to check on the quality of IAs we could expect some effects. We reason that 
the establishment of the RPC in 2009 has enhanced regulatory analysis either 
through feedback and advice on draft IAs provided or through better IAs prepared 
in anticipation of RPC peer review (Hypothesis 3). We therefore hypothesize: 
 
H2: After the release of statutory guidelines the IAs become analytically richer. 
H3: IAs produced after the establishment of the oversight body, the RPC, are 
analytically richer than IAs produced before. 
 
Hypothesis 4: election years  
 
At the end of an administration, regulators are under pressure to get so-called 
midnight regulations out of the door (Beermann 2009; for an extension and test on 
IA, see Ellig, McLaughlin and Morrall 2013). This pressure, the argument goes, leads 
to poorer IAs when we get closer to the electoral deadline  W hence the learning 
process is interrupted. We elaborate on this logic - and look at dawn as well as 
midnight. In the first months after elections  W we submit  W the bureaucracy waits 
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for signals on the regulatory philosophy of the executive. This causes a sort of 
relaxation in the analytical richness of the IA. This argument is most likely flawed in 
the US, where Presidents typically issue executive orders on IAs in the first months, 
if not weeks, of their administration. However, there is nothing like that in the UK, 
so there probably is uncertainty after elections. We therefore also consider a 
modified version of our first hypothesis covering election years  W which is 
characterized by two effects, midnight and dawn, in the same direction. 
 
H4: Over time election years affect the trend in compliance with the requirements 
for IA.  
 
Hypothesis 5: core issues and constituencies 
 
The content of specific IA tests may depend on issues and constituencies. 
Environmental regulators  W such as the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs  W may invest more in the analysis of the environmental impacts than, 
for instance, the Department for Work and Pensions or the Cabinet Office, 
especially in periods of austerity. Classic studies on the bureaucracy (Downs 1966; 
Wilson 1991) show that there is signification variation in how individual agencies 
and departments behave, but in the end they tend to develop routinized 
relationships with their external environment, especially the populations they 
regulate, serve, or control. Regulators build and cultivate their reputation in the 
constituencies they serve (Carpenter 2010). A department that has industry as key 
constituency will go deeper in the analysis of costs, especially costs for industry, 
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much better than the Department for Work and Pensions, which is most likely to 
put a high premium on impacts related to social welfare. Environmental or health 
departments will take care of sustainability or public health much better than the 
median department. We are not in a position to say which of these factors feature 
most prominently. However, we can test the claim that regulators learn to carry out 
IA unevenly, thereby reflecting patterns of departmental specialization. This leads 
us to: 
 
H5: Departments do not implement IA requirements evenly. Their analyses of the 
portion of the requirements that reflects a departmental core mission are 
analytically richer than their analyses of the portion of the requirements that does 
not relate to a departmental core mission. 
 
Hypothesis 6: position of individual departments within the executive 
 
We can also test whether the regulators are sensitive to the political priorities 
within the executive. Let us consider that core departments, tasked with designing 
broad government policy agendas and controlling public expenditure (think of the 
Cabinet Office or the Treasury), are more likely to support regulatory analysis. 
Classic regulatory departments like the Health and Safety Executive or the 
Department for Work and Pensions should be less enthusiastic about learning how 
to perform regulatory analysis. Typically ministers that feel strongly about 
controlling the budget and limiting expenditure are part of the core executive, 
whilst regulatory departments are somewhat peripheral to the key expenditure 
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control agenda of the Prime Minister and the Treasury in the UK. We therefore 
hypothesize: 
 
H6a: IAs carried out by departments close to the political centre of government are 
analytically richer than IAs carried out by peripheral departments. 
 
And yet, even if the degree of government control over departments has an effect, 
the direction of that effect is far from being certain. One could argue that key 
departments are close to the political agenda of the Cabinet Office, and will not feel 
under pressure to perform good regulatory analysis. It is the peripheral department 
that is obliged to report on various effects of their policies before getting clearance 
by cabinet committees. The observable implication of this counter-argument is the 
following: 
 
H6b: IAs carried out by peripheral departments are analytically richer than IAs 
carried out by core departments. 
 
In the following, we put these propositions to an empirical test. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: EXPERIENCE 
 
Let us start with Figure 1 which visualizes the main index between 2005 and 2011, 
showing the richness of IA in this period. Although the effect is rather small (R2 
linear =.035), Figure 1 suggests that, since 2005, IAs have become richer in analysis. 
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This finding is also supported by trend analysis. Based on a one-way ANOVA with a 
polynomial contrast up to the 5th grade and publication years of IA (in our sample: 
seven) as grouping variable, we identify a statistically significant positive linear 
trend of analytical richness over time (p<.01). We also observe a significant quartic 
trend at a 10 per cent confidence interval, indicating that the positive linear trend 
might be subject to bends and blips, highlighted too by the graph.v 
 
--- FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
Intuitively, this could be interpreted in three ways. a) Learning through experience: 
over time officers become more familiar with the requirements for policy appraisal 
and develop their analytical capacity. They learn how to carry out tests, build 
capacity to obtain data and supportive materials, and consult better. b) Learning 
through specialization within departments: officers who have prepared excellent 
IAs in the past are more likely to be asked again to prepare another. c) Learning 
through new hires: in response to poor IAs prepared in the past, departments may 
decide to recruit more qualified individuals. To be clear, we are not in a position to 
test which of those three intuitions explains the analytical richness of IA in our 
sample best. This would require qualitative data that is difficult to obtain in a large-
N setting. 
 
Yet all three intuitions invite an important question: what ŚĂƉƉĞŶƐ  ‘ŝŶ ƚŝŵĞ ? ƚŚĂƚ
makes officers learn how to prepare better IAs; why would departments select in-
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house specialists for policy appraisal or recruit new talent? Surely, officers do not 
learn how to use policy instruments by tearing off calendar pages. They learn by 
preparing analyses, by consulting the guidelines, by receiving internal and external 
feedback. The implication, then, becomes: the more IAs the departments produce, 
the more experience they gain, resulting in better IAs over time. Likewise, it is 
plausible to assume that intra-departmental processes of specialization depend on 
the number of IAs a department produces on average; and so does the willingness 
to recruit new, well-qualified staff. We therefore assume that a very productive 
department (say, 20 IAs per year) improves quickly whereas a less productive 
ministry (say, 4 IAs a year) requires more time to reach the same standard. 
 
tĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞ ƚŚŝƐ ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂů  ‘ƐƚĂĐŬƐ ? ? hƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
date of each IA, we sorted all impact statements in our sample, chronologically and 
ďǇĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?tĞƚŚĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚ ‘ƐƚĂĐŬƐ ?ŽĨ /Ɛ PƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ  ? /ƐŽĨĂĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?
the first 10, the first 20, the first 30 and so forth. The index, so we hypothesize, 
improves as a department appraises more and more rules. We selected eight 
departments, all of which in operation since 2005. Table 1 below summarizes our 
findings: 
 
--- TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
What does the data tell us? First, we compare the first and the last stack of each 
department and observe improvement in five out of eight cases, most notably for 
the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Food Standards 
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Agency. In other words, the more IAs those five departments completed, the better 
they became at providing information. In two cases, however, the Department of 
Transport and the Home Office, earlier IAs were better than later ones, and there is 
no significant development over time for the HMRC.  
 
Second, although there is evidence that overall departments produce better IAs as 
they gain experience, this trend is not observed in all departments. The IAs of the 
Department for Trade and Industry, for instance, show an erratic pattern whereby 
weaker IAs follow better ones and vice versa. Third, the first five to ten IAs seem to 
be crucial: many departments made a step forward here but then reached a plateau 
without further development.  
 
&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ƚŚĞ/ƐŽĨƐŽŵĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇŽĨŚŝŐŚƋƵĂůŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ ‘ƐƚĂĐŬ ? ?
just see for example the IAs prepared by Home Office, whereas others took some 
time to reach the same standard. Apparently, departments do not start at a similar 
baseline and improve, whereby the degree of improvement then depends on the 
number of IAs prepared. Quite the contrary, while there is some evidence to 
suggest that the continuous production of IA contributes to the building of 
institutional capacity, we are reluctant to make a strong case: It seems the 
hypothesis can only be confirmed for departments starting at a lower baseline. 
Ministries that have already begun at a higher standard quickly reach a plateau 
characterized by no or little further improvement. This may be because they 
developed analytical capacity for appraising policy before the period under 
consideration here  W e.g., a certain department may have historically invested more 
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in capacity for economic assessment of proposals, independently of IA 
requirements (see Dunlop and Radaelli 2016b on different notions of capacity in the 
context of policy learning). No doubt other factors need to be discussed  W as we do 
in the remainder of this article. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: LEARNING THROUGH GUIDELINES 
 
Thus, can we say that organizations learn? Perhaps. Sometimes. But the 
incremental development of in-house capacity  W through learning-by-doing, intra-
departmental specialization, or new appointments  W is probably not the only and 
certainly not the most relevant factor. After all, if person A completed an HMRC IA 
in 2005, and person B prepared an HMRC IA in 2006, it is difficult to argue that 
there is per se a learning effect over time  W unless there are mechanisms in place 
ensuring that previous experiences are passed on, repeated, refreshed. 
Unfortunately, we do not possess data on training events offered on IA. However, 
guidance documents are an alternative way of passing on knowledge to new 
generations of officers. One can suggest that, when the Department for Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform released its 2007 guidelines, IAs have improved. 
We carry out two tests to explore this claim. 
 
First, the 2007 guidelines included more precision on how to carry out cost-benefit 
analysis and a template with an overview page which summarized key findings on 
total costs and benefits and similar tests. The new summary page was supposed to 
remind officers of several important tests to be carried out before finalizing the IA. 
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Consequently, we only look at IA sections dealing with costs and benefits to see 
whether they have improved after the adoption of the 2007 guidelines. To this end, 
we use sub-index 1, aggregating data on measures related to the quantification or 
monetization of costs and benefits in IA, and create a dummy variable to contrast 
pre- and post-guideline IAs.  
 
The results of the t-test, displayed in Table 2 below, indicate that respective IA 
sections became significantly richer after the introduction of the guidelines. 
 
--- TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
Second, we compare the overall quality of IA before and after the adoption of the 
2007 guidelines, assuming their innovations informed analytical steps more 
generally. To this end, we use the same dummy variable employed before to 
contrast pre- and post-guidelines IAs. We hereby expect a cohort effect, according 
to which IAs published after the adoption of the new guideline are, on average, 
analytically richer than those completed before. Tables 3 below reports our 
findings. 
 
--- TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
We find that IAs pre-guideline are generally less rich than post-guideline ones. 
However, the effect size value is not impressive. This suggests that IA guidelines, at 
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least in the period we examined, supported the learning process, but only 
moderately. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: LEARNING THROUGH REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 
 
Statutory guidelines are not the only mechanism of learning established by the 
government. The Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC) appraises draft IAs using five 
criteria: problem definition, presentation of options, evidence base, cost-benefit 
analysis, and overall presentation. One can therefore argue that the RPC has 
enhanced regulatory analysis, either directly through feedback and advice on draft 
IAs or indirectly, i.e. regulators go deeper and wider in their analysis in anticipation 
of RPC scrutiny. 
 
In order to probe this intuition, we compare the values of the main index before 
and after the establishment of the RPC. We create a dummy to distinguish pre- and 
post-RPC establishment IAs and perform a t-test. Tables 4 below summarizes our 
findings. 
 
--- TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
They do indeed suggest that post-RPC IAs are richer in analysis than their pre-RPC 
counterparts  W thereby supporting the intuition. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4: LEARNING IN ELECTION YEARS 
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The adoption of midnight regulations, so we hypothesize, may come with more 
superficial IAs. Likewise, in the first months after the election the new ministers will 
press hard to send signals to their constituencies with the swift adoption of new 
regulations, which will be supported by sub-standard analysis.  
 
General Elections were held in the UK on 5 May 2005 and 6 May 2010. Trend 
analysis and comparison of estimated marginal means (see Table 6) has already 
suggested that, along a significant linear trend, there was a drop in the index in the 
election year 2010. We then performed a further ANOVA with planned contrasts to 
explore the effect of electoral years on IA. The tested contrasts capture the effects 
of the 2005 and of the 2010 general elections, see Tables 5 and 6 below (for a 
general discussion of this method, see Seltman 2015vi). 
 
--- TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
The effects, i.e. the differences between the mean values of the index in contrasted 
years, are statistically significantvii and indicate, in particular, that in 2010 the 
analytical richness of IAs has significantly decreased. In other words, public 
managers did indeed produce poorer IAs in election years (Table 6). 
 
--- TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE --- 
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However, we do not know yet whether this is caused by midnight or dawn 
regulations. Let us study the timeline in more detail: Tables 7 and 8 below display 
the index in the months before and after the 2005 and 2010 general elections. 
Months highlighted in red are below the annual average, months highlighted in 
green are above. 
 
--- TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
According to our 2005 data, dawn regulations did not negatively affect IA quality. 
True, departments completed a handful of substandard IAs immediately after the 
elections in May. However, these were minor policy initiatives on milk pricing and 
land drainage improvements that can hardly be interpreted as pet projects of 
policy-makers. At the same time, we have some above-average IAs published four 
weeks before the elections in April 2005, and the January and February IAs are only 
slightly below the national average  W suggesting that midnight regulations had only 
minor effects or no effect at all. 
 
--- TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
The 2010 data is more interesting. Again, there is no supporting evidence that 
midnight regulation made IAs poorer. IAs in late 2009 and early 2010 may be less 
rich than in previous or subsequent years, but this is certainly not because officers 
drafting IAs lowered their standards before the election. Many of the stronger 
months in this period actually fall in the period December 2009 to April 2010; in 
26 
 
fact, March 2010 is the only month that is below the annual average. Instead, the 
low 2010 performance is clearly due to IAs prepared after the Conservative-Liberal 
government began to serve. We only have four IAs between June and September 
2010 (and they were good), but when the newly elected government began to 
adopt a larger number of policies in October 2010, their IAs were always below the 
annual average. In other words, it is the post-election IAs that dragged the year 
down. There is a clear effect of dawn regulations. Perhaps not in the sense that 
policy-makers tried to get some pet projects out of the door immediately after the 
election. However, it is plausible that officers were somewhat insecure as to 
whether the newly elected government would place as much emphasis on the 
regulatory reform agenda, including regulatory analysis, as the previous Labour 
government did. Plus, the new government led by David Cameron was the first 
coalition government in more than 60 years; unsurprisingly, this had an impact on 
how well the administration operated after the new government assumed power. 
 
The findings can, to a large degree, be explained by the context in which the two 
elections were contested: when the 2010 general elections were held, Labour had 
been in power for more than 13 years, and there was little confidence that Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown would succeed in winning the fourth subsequent victory 
since 1997 for his party. In other words, there was a realistic chance for change of 
government in 2010, and we are not surprised that, under these conditions, the 
logic of midnight and dawn regulations applies, although much less so than 
expected for midnight regulations. The 2005 elections, by contrast, were much less 
contested; the overall expectation that Prime Minister Tony Blair would land 
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ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌǀŝĐƚŽƌǇĨŽƌ>ĂďŽƵƌŵĂǇŚĂǀĞ ‘ĚĞĂĐƚŝǀĂƚĞĚ ?ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐƵƐƵĂůůǇƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐŝŶ
midnight and dawn regulations. It is impossible to draw strong conclusions from 
these data, but it seems that elections have an influence, although not in the 
mechanical way that the simplistic midnight-dawn regulations argument suggests. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 5: SPECIALIZATION IN POLICY DOMAINS 
 
Let us now consider the argument that departments do not perform analysis 
evenly. The richness is deeper in sections that mirror their core mission and their 
ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ? 
 
To probe this, we consider four types of departments: economy-oriented, 
environmental policy-oriented, social policy-oriented and a residual category with 
the others. The underlying assumption is that departments operating, say, in the 
field of environment have their constituency there  W such as the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs  W and invest more time and effort on the 
environmental impacts of a proposed policy than, for instance, the Department for 
Work and Pensions or the Cabinet Office. This generates a four-level categorical 
independent variable, summarized in Table 9 below. 
 
--- TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
It goes without saying that we cannot use the overall index to test this hypothesis. 
After all, we do not want to know whether departments specializing in 
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environmental policies produce richer IAs than departments with a health and 
welfare portfolio. Statistically, what we want to know is whether IA requirements 
related to social dimensions, such as gender equality or access to health and 
education, are implemented more rigorously in a department specializing in social 
policy. Likewise, do departments like Business, Innovation and Skills analyze the 
impacts of their policies on trade, jobs or growth better than other departments? 
 
To answer this question, we use sub-indexes 2, 3 and 4, aggregating data on the 
richness of IA related to economic, social and environmental impacts, respectively. 
We compare the mean values of these sub-indexes across different types of 
departments (economic, social, environmental and other specialization) using three 
separate one-way ANOVAs, one for each index. The one-way ANOVA on the sub-
index on economic analyses is not significant. On the other hand, the two one-way 
ANOVAs on the social and environmental sub-indexes are significant, overall (p<.01 
for both). Table 10 shows the mean values for each sub-index across each category 
of departments.  
 
--- TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
What does the data tell us? Specialist departments usually produce better analyses 
in their home category than other departments: the richest analyses of 
environmental impacts are carried out by environmental regulators; departments 
working on welfare, health, pensions submit the richest analyses of social impacts, 
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and economic departments deliver above-average analyses of impacts on the 
economy.  
 
In order to qualify the overall significance of the two ANOVAs on the social and 
environmental sub-indexes, we perform post-hoc multiple comparisons tests. With 
regards to the environmental sub-index, we observe a remarkable effect size, 
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚ ďǇ ŽŚĞŶ ?s d, whereby the difference between the mean values of 
analytical richness of environmental analyses carried out by environmental 
departments is larger than one standard deviation with respect to the mean values 
of economic departments. viii Likewise, we observe a noticeable effect size value 
with regards to the social sub-index.ix 
 
However, the story does not end here. This is because there are some effects that 
should not be there. According to our reasoning, departments do not specialize in 
categories outside their home category. Under this qualification, we are only able to 
confirm our intuition for environmental and social impacts. The findings on 
economic impacts are less straightforward. True, economic regulators produce 
above-average analyses of economic impacts. But in contrast to our expectation, 
those departments are not the only ones to return high-quality analyses of impacts 
on the economy. Environmental and social regulators are strong performers too 
when it comes to impacts on trade, growth and jobs.  
 
dŽ ƐƵŵ ƵƉ ƚŚĞŶ ? ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐ ůĞĂƌŶ ŵŽƌĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘ĐŽƌĞ ďƵƐŝŶĞƐs ? ? ďƵƚ ǁĞ ĂůƐŽ
observed instances of specialization not predicted by this argument. We know little 
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about the reasons why all departments do extraordinarily well when it comes to 
economic analyses. More qualitative research is needed. We offer two intuitions: 
first, in the age of austerity, environmental and social regulators are under 
exceptional pressure to justify further intervention into the economy, resulting in 
overall strong regulatory analysis. Second, governments have put a high premium 
on fostering economic growth  W the official documentation instructs public 
managers to design policy having regard to growth and to the de-regulatory targets 
(Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2015). Consequently, analyses of 
economic impacts may have become a priority also for those departments 
regulating policy areas other than business and trade. 
 
Although we observe departmental specialization, we know little about the 
underlying mechanisms. We offer three possible micro-causes: pressure of 
department-specific interest groups (this is how we framed the hypothesis); 
analytical capacity developed via intimate knowledge of regulated sectors; and 
finally, sector-specific analytical guidelines. Should expertise and knowledge explain 
departmental specialization, then we would ask whether there are significant 
differences between countries with different administrative cultures, specifically 
between countries (such as the UK) emphasizing the importance of generalists and 
those conceiving the public service as a realm of specialists (Bulmer 1988; Knill 
2001). All this is material for further research. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 6: WHERE YOU ARE IN THE EXECUTIVE MATTERS 
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Let us now reason that core departments, tasked with designing broad government 
policy agendas and controlling public expenditure (for instance the Cabinet Office or 
the Treasury), are more likely to support regulatory analysis, for example because 
they believe that IA really pre-empts inefficient regulation. Both Labour 
governments and the Coalition government have made efforts to increase control 
capacity at the centre (Dommett and Flinders 2015; Evans 2009). Classic regulatory 
departments like the Health and Safety Executive or the Department for Work and 
Pensions should be less enthusiastic about having to set aside precious resources 
for regulatory analysis and presenting their numbers in cabinet-level committees. 
An alternative proposition, however, might well be that regulatory departments 
deliver IAs that are broader and deeper because they find this is the best way to 
justify their task expansion. 
 
To test these propositions, we distinguish three types of departments, thereby 
creating a new categorical grouping variable: first, core departments tasked to 
manage classic state functions such as foreign affairs, home policy, justice and the 
budget; second, peripheral departments associated with spending and regulation in 
areas like the environment, health, social welfare and education; third, finally, 
departments responsible for advancing the regulatory reform agenda in the UK. The 
assignment of departments follows suggestions made in the literature on the core 
executive (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990; Elgie 2011). Table 11 below informs about 
the types of departments in our sample: 
 
--- TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE --- 
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We then performed a one-way ANOVA to test the differences in the mean values of 
our index of analytical richness across the above categories. The mean values across 
typology of departments are presented in Table 12 below:  
 
--- TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
The findings, supported by further post-hoc multiple comparisons, suggest that 
peripheral departments outperform core departments with an average to low 
effect sizex and also, quite surprisingly, BERR-BIS-DTI, though the latter result is not 
statistically significant. BERR-BIS-DTI is a department which has changed its name 
(and some tasks) multiple times, but has always been at the forefront when it 
comes to promoting the Better Regulation agenda. Our data reject Hypothesis 6a 
which suggested that core departments and, even more so, BERR-BIS-DTI would 
spearhead regulatory analysis. Instead, we find support for Hypothesis 6b: it is the 
peripheral department that produces higher-quality IAs. A solid IA - we reason - is a 
necessary condition to gather consensus within cabinet-level committees with de-
regulation preferences. Given the de-regulatory zeal of Gordon Brown and George 
Osborne, a strong IA is a good way to defend regulatory proposals generated by the 
 ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ? ? 
 
CONCLUSION 
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Our evidence suggests that experience and analytical capacity in different 
departments play a role in the learning process. Guidelines that explain how to 
carry out IA in practice support the process, but moderately. A specialized, IA-
focused regulatory oversight body matters, and this may explain why the 
government has increased the responsibilities of the RPC in the years following the 
period we examined in our project. Elections have different effects on regulatory 
analysis, depending on the context in which they are contested  W but we only had 
two elections in our period. Departments specialize and reflect their core policy 
sectors, but some have greater analytical capacity overall. Peripheral departments 
seem to invest more in IA, arguably because they know that robust analysis is key to 
ĐĂďŝŶĞƚ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ĂŶ ĞƌĂ ŽĨ ĂƵƐƚĞƌŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ĂďŽƵƚ  ‘ƌĞĚ ƚĂƉĞ ? ĂŶĚ
regulatory costs. 
 
And yet, does it matter? It does: whether the objective is the political control of the 
bureaucracy or more evidence-based policy (see introduction), detailed information 
is crucial. If IAs are not informative, do not report on major cost and benefit 
categories or are silent on consultation, a necessary condition for evidence-based 
policy is missing. At the same time, stakeholders in fire-alarm scenarios will be 
largely disempowered and principals left in the dark as to whether they are actually 
in control of their agents (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987). Thus, it is topical to 
understand and explain what generates richness over time. The role and scope of 
the RPC and the official guidelines can be fine-tuned to draw more information 
from the IA  W the recent evolution of the RPC is indicative of the attempt to 
leverage IAs figures to meet de-regulatory objectives. dĂƌŐĞƚƐ ůŝŬĞ  ‘ŽŶĞ-in-one-ŽƵƚ ?
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and better regulation framework manuals are evidence that governments 
manipulate IA to pursue their regulatory reform priorities.  
 
At the same time, the difference between the de-regulatory agenda of the core 
executive and the regulatory missions of some departments may create conflicts 
between reducing regulatory costs and protecting lives and the environment. Here 
the apparently technical exercise of performing one type of analysis or another 
becomes the terrain where regulatory policy paradigms may clash. This may be part 
of the broader story of whether parties in government have more influence on IA 
than the preferences of departments (in the UK) or agencies (in the US)  W Ellig and 
colleagues (2013 ? ůŽŽŬĞĚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ h^ ĂŶĚ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ  ‘ĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? ƚŚĂƚ
ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ďĞƚƚĞƌ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ KďĂŵĂ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ůŝďĞƌĂů ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? ƚŚĂƚ
perform better during the Bush administration.  
 
Methodologically, we strongly defend our choice of having appraised six potential 
factors with nuanced, tailored statistical analyses rather than opting for a classic 
ŵƵůƚŝǀĂƌŝĂƚĞŵŽĚĞů ?KƵƌ ‘ŐĞŶƚůĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĚĂƚĂůůŽǁƐƵƐƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽƚŚĞ
key themes in the field about political control of the bureaucracy, learning and 
evidence-based policy with more detail and nuances. This  W we believe  W is also the 
type of research finding that is more useful to policy-makers. 
 
Our results come with caveats: we need more research on a longer time-span 
covering the years after 2011. Also, regulatory analysis is a component of legislative 
and parliamentary processes, at least in the UK. The next generation of projects 
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should regress our data on different variables, such as duration, conflict in the 
lawmaking process, media attention and possibly data generated by post-
implementation reviews of regulations that were originally appraised via IA. Our 
index has properties that make it more suitable for research across time and space 
than other scorecards measures of IA content proposed in the past. Researchers 
could use it within sophisticated models of the policy agenda (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993). Future research should also distinguish major and minor policy 
proposals; this is because departments in the UK are encouraged to take a lighter 
approach towards IA if the impacts are likely to be minor. Finally, qualitative and 
ethnographic researchers could extract from our data the richest and poorest IAs 
and document the different usages by bureaucrats and politicians in policy 
formulation. There is a whole story to tell about meanings, interpretations and 
usages of regulatory analysis, thus reconnecting studies like ours to the broader 
field of knowledge utilization. 
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Figure 1. Scatterplot of the values of the main index. The index (y-axis) ranges from 0 to 1. IAs are grouped 
according to the month and year of publication (x-axis). The blue line represents the linear fit line (R2 linear 
=.035). The red line represents the locally weighted scatterplot smoothing line (LOESS: Epanechnikov Kernel, 50 
per cent of points fitted). 
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Table 1. Analytical richness of IA per department and number of IAs, based on the main index. The index ranges 
from 0 to 1. 
 
DEPARTMENT DEFRA DH DT DTI FSA HMRC HMT  HO 
Number of IAsxi 56 28 45 30 25 35 21 21 
First 5 IAs 0.528 0.522 0.631 0.491 0.447 0.572 0.538 0.641 
First 10 IAs 0.577 0.544 0.614 0.522 0.524 0.532 0.498 0.645 
First 15 IAs 0.581 0.569 0.621 0.511 0.569 0.530 0.515 0.624 
First 20 IAs 0.565 0.564 0.624 0.502 0.577 0.529 0.553 0.622 
First 25 IAs 0.576 0.560 0.618 0.514 0.569 0.552 
 
  
First 30 IAs 0.572 
 
0.616 0.533 
 
0.573 
 
  
First 40 IAs 0.589 
 
0.624 
    
  
First 50 IAs 0.617               
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Table 2. T-test, mean values of the sub-index on cost-benefit analysis before and after the publication of the 
2007 IA guideline. The index ranges from 0 to 1. 
 
DATE MEAN STD DEVIATION 
Pre 2007 guidelines 0.464 0.149 
Post 2007 guidelines 0.596 0.184 
ƉAM ? ? ? ?ŽŚĞŶ ?ƐĚA? ? ? ? ? 
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Table 3. T-test, mean values of the IA index before and after the publication of the 2007 IA guideline. The index 
ranges from 0 to 1. 
 
DATE MEAN STD DEVIATION 
Pre 2007 guidelines 0.559 0.124 
Post 2007 guidelines 0.608 0.160 
ƉAM ? ? ? ?ŽŚĞŶ ?ƐĚA? ? ? ? ? 
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Table 4. T-test, mean values of the IA index before and after the establishment of the RPC. The index ranges 
from 0 to 1. 
 
DATE MEAN STD DEVIATION 
Pre RPC 0.581 0.145 
Post RPC 0.612 0.159 
ƉA? ? ? ? ? ?ŽŚĞŶ ?ƐĚA? ? ? ? ? 
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Table 5: Contrast coefficients.  
 
YEAR 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Contrast -1 1 0 0 1 -2 1 
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Table 6: Mean values of the IA index across years. The index ranges from 0 to 1. 
 
YEAR N MEAN STD DEVIATION 
2005 82 0.551 0.127 
2006 93 0.558 0.127 
2007 73 0.598 0.131 
2008 96 0.590 0.164 
2009 78 0.618 0.154 
2010 56 0.586 0.168 
2011 37 0.650 0.147 
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Table 7. IA index before and after the general election of 5 May 2005. The index ranges from 0 to 1. 
 
MONTH 
NOV 
2004 
DEC 
2004 
JAN 
2005 
FEB 
2005 
MAR 
2005 
APR 
2005 
MAY 
2005 
TOTAL 
IA INDEX 
(MIDNIGHT) 
N/A N/A 0.520 0.530 0.464 0.642 0.459 
0.554 MONTH 
JUN 
2005 
JUL  
2005 
AUG 
2005 
SEP 
2005 
OCT 
2005 
NOV 
2005 
DEC 
2005 
IA INDEX  
(DAWN) 
0.558 0.639 0.464 0.616 0.575 0.668 0.558 
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Table 8. Quality of RIA before and after the general election of 6 May 2010. The index ranges from 0 to 1. 
 
MONTH 
NOV 
2009 
DEC 
2009 
JAN 
2010 
FEB 
2010 
MAR 
2010 
APR 
2010 
MAY 
2010 
TOTAL 
IA INDEX 
(MIDNIGHT) 
0.576 0.704 0.651 0.594 0.556 0.652 NONE 
0.589 MONTH 
JUN 
2010 
JUL  
2010 
AUG 
2010 
SEP 
2010 
OCT 
2010 
NOV 
2010 
DEC 
2010 
IA INDEX 
(DAWN) 
0.595 NONE NONE 0.769 0.543 0.522 0.563 
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Table 9: Departments across policy sectors. 
 
 POLICY SECTOR  DEPARTMENTS 
 Economicxii  BERR, BIS, DFES, DIUS, DTI, HMT 
 Environmental  DECC, DEFRA, FC 
 Social  DCFS, DH, DWP, FSA, HSE 
 Other  CO, DCA, DCLG, DCMS, DT, FCO, HMRC, HO, MOJ, ODPM 
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Table 10: Indexes of sectoral analyses across departments. The indexes range from 0 to 1.  
 
DEPARTMENTAL 
SPECIALIZATION 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS SOCIAL IMPACTS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
Economic 0.652 0.502 0.402 
Environmental 0.648 0.492 0.519 
Social 0.633 0.585 0.423 
Other 0.645 0.547 0.442 
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Table 11: Core and non-core departments in the UK. 
 
TYPE OF DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENTS 
Regulatory reform BERR, BIS, DTI 
Core CO, DCA, DIUS, FCO, HMRC, HMT, HO, MOJ, ODPM 
Peripheral DCLG, DCMS, DCSF, DECC, DEFRA, DFES, DH, DT, DWP, FC, FSA, HSE 
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Table 12: One-way ANOVA of IA index across core, peripheral and reform-oriented departments. The index 
ranges from 0 to 1.  
 
DEPARTMENTS MEAN STD DEVIATION 
Regulatory reform 0.574 0.14 
Core 0.560 0.148 
Peripheral 0.602 0.147 
ANOVA overall significance p=.019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
 
Table A1. List of departments  
 
ACRONYM  DEPARTMENT  OPERATING 
 BERR  Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform  2007 - 2009 
 BIS  Department for Business, Innovation and Skills  2009 -  
 CO  Cabinet Office  1916 -  
 DCA  Department for Constitutional Affairs  2003 - 2007 
 DCLG  Department for Communities and Local Government  2006 -  
 DCMS  Department for Culture, Media and Sport  1997 -  
 DCSF  Department for Children, Schools and Families  2007 - 2010 
 DECC  Department for Energy and Climate Change  2008 -  
 DEFRA  Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs  2001 -  
 DFES  Department for Education and Skills  2001 - 2007 
 DH  Department of Health  1988 - 
 DIUS  Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills  2007 - 2009 
 DT  Department for Transport  2002 - 
 DTI  Department of Trade and Industry  1970 - 2007 
 DWP  Department for Work and Pensions  2001 -  
 FC  Forestry Commission  1919 -  
 FCO  Foreign and Commonwealth Office  1968 -  
 FSA  Food Standards Agency  2000 -  
 HMRC  Her Majesty's Revenues and Customs  2005 -  
 HMT  Her Majesty's Treasury  1066 - 
 HO  Home Office  1782 -  
 HSE  Health and Safety Executive  1974 - 
 MOJ  Ministry of Justice  2007 -  
 ODPM  Office of the Deputy Prime Minister  2001 - 2006 
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Table A2. Number of IAs in our sample, per department and year 
 
  DEPARTMENTS 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TOTAL 
  BERR -- -- 2 13 4 -- -- 19 
  BIS -- -- -- -- 4 6 5 15 
  CO 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
  DCA 1 2 -- -- -- -- -- 3 
  DCLG 0 6 9 19 8 11 10 63 
  DCMS 3 4 5 1 3 4 0 20 
  DCSF -- -- 0 2 0 0 -- 2 
  DECC -- -- -- 0 3 4 4 11 
  DEFRA 13 12 14 14 9 3 2 67 
  DFES 4 1 1 -- -- -- -- 6 
  DH 8 4 4 10 5 1 0 32 
  DIUS -- -- 1 1 1 -- -- 3 
  DT 14 6 10 7 8 10 9 64 
  DTI 9 28 4 -- -- -- -- 41 
  DWP 3 1 1 2 1 1 0 9 
  FC 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
  FCO 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 
  FSA 5 4 7 3 3 3 0 25 
  HMRC 6 7 7 8 8 3 1 40 
  HMT 1 6 1 4 5 1 4 22 
  HO 5 4 3 10 6 2 1 31 
  HSE 3 3 0 1 2 0 0 9 
  MOJ 0 0 3 2 7 7 0 20 
  ODPM 6 4 -- -- -- -- -- 10 
  Total 82 93 73 98 78 56 37 517 
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Table A3. Scorecard 
 
  NO  NAME 
THE SCORED IA 
1 First name of scorer 
2 Date of scoring 
3 Time required 
4 Name of policy initiative 
5 Origin of policy initiative 
6 Type of policy initiative 
7 Department or agency preparing IA 
8 Joint submission of IA 
9 Year of publication 
10 Number of pages 
11 Summary page 
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
12 Identifies market failure 
13 Identifies regulatory failure 
14 States objectives 
15 States specific objectives 
16 States operational objectives 
POLICY OPTIONS 
17 Considers the zero option 
18 Considers at least one alternative to the zero option 
19 Considers at least two alternatives to the zero option 
20 Considers improvements in implementation and enforcement  
21 Considers self-regulation 
22 Considers regulation through information and guidelines 
23 Considers regulation through market-based instruments 
24 Considers regulation through direct public sector financial intervention 
25 Considers co-regulation 
26 Considers prescriptive regulatory actions 
CONSULTATION 
27 Reports on consultation 
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28 Presents positions expressed by consulted parties 
29 Cooperation between departments 
ESTIMATION OF COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE SUGGESTED POLICY OPTION 
30 Presents qualitative or quantitative statements on costs 
31 Quantifies at least some costs  
32 Monetizes at least some costs 
33 Monetizes all or nearly all costs 
34 Provides range for total costs 
35 Presents qualitative statements on benefits 
36 Quantifies at least some benefits 
37 Monetizes at least some benefits 
38 Monetizes all or nearly all benefits 
39 Provides range for total benefits 
40 Calculates net benefits 
41 Provides a range for net benefits 
42 Calculates cost effectiveness 
ESTIMATION OF COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY OPTIONS 
43 Presents qualitative statements on costs of at least one alternative option 
44 Quantifies at least some costs of at least one alternative option 
45 Monetizes at least some costs of at least one alternative option 
46 Monetizes all or nearly all costs of all options 
47 Provides range for total costs of at least one alternative option 
48 Presents qualitative statements on benefits of at least one alternative option 
49 Quantifies at least some benefits of at least one alternative option 
50 Monetizes at least some benefits of at least one alternative option 
51 Monetizes all or nearly all benefits of all options 
52 Provides range for total benefits of at least one alternative option 
53 Calculates net benefits of at least one alternative option 
54 Provides a range for net benefits of at least one alternative option 
55 Calculates cost effectiveness of at least one alternative option 
ANALYSES 
56 Carries out risk assessment 
57 Carries out risk-risk analysis 
58 
 
58 Considers precautionary principle 
59 Carries out sensitivity analysis 
60 Identifies discount rate 
61 Value of discount rate 
62 Provides number of lives or of life years or quality-adjusted life-years (QUALYs) saved 
63 Monetizes number of lives saved 
AFFECTED PARTIES 
64 Discusses whether regulation imposes costs on citizens 
65 Discusses whether regulation imposes costs on specific categories of citizens 
66 Discusses whether regulation imposes costs on consumers 
67 Discusses whether regulation imposes costs on the economic sector 
68 Discusses whether regulation imposes costs on a few large firms 
69 Discusses whether regulation imposes costs on the non-profit sector 
70 Discusses whether citizens benefit from regulation 
71 Discusses whether specific categories of citizens benefit from regulation 
72 Discusses whether consumers benefit from regulation 
73 Discusses whether the economic sector  benefits from regulation 
74 Discusses whether a few large firms benefit from regulation 
75 Discusses whether the non-profit sector benefits from regulation 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
76 Assesses impact on competitiveness 
77 Assesses impact on competition 
78 Assesses impact on small and medium enterprises 
79 Assesses impact on investment or innovation 
80 Assesses impact on the common market 
81 Assesses impact on GDP or other indicators of economic growth 
82 Assesses impact on trade 
83 Assesses impact on inflation 
84 Assesses impact on administrative burdens 
85 Quantifies administrative burdens for businesses 
86 Quantifies administrative burdens for citizens 
87 Quantifies administrative burdens for public administration 
SOCIAL IMPACTS 
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88 Assesses impact on health and safety 
89 Assesses impact on employment 
90 Assesses impact on standards and rights related to job quality 
91 Assesses impact on the social inclusion and protection of particular groups 
92 Assesses impact on equal opportunities, non-discrimination and gender equality 
93 Assesses impact on the access to and effects on social protection, health and education 
94 Assesses impact on fundamental rights 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
95 Assesses impact on renewable or non-renewable resources 
96 Assesses impact on biodiversity 
97 Assesses impact on air quality 
98 Assesses impact on transport and the use of energy 
99 Assesses impact on water quality  
100 Assesses impact on soil quality and resources 
101 Assesses impact on climate 
MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
102 Contains a section on monitoring and evaluation 
103 Mentions a review clause for the proposal 
104 Contains indicators for evaluation 
OTHER 
105 Overall judgment 
106 Additional comments 
107 File name 
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PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS (INCLUDING TABLES A4, A5 AND A6 AND 
FIGURE A1) 
 
Our coding relied on a classic scorecard approach, widely used by policy makers and 
academics. We then used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to aggregate our 
data, this step reflects an inductive approach towards our data. This section 
motivates, details and provides supporting statistics of the various steps undertaken 
during the PCA.  
 
The degree to which IAs comply with guideline requirements is not a latent trait 
which can be described by an underlying hidden model or a path. We therefore 
chose a dimension reduction technique that enables us to summarise our data 
without reference to a specific model. Instead, the technique relies on a simple 
idea: to explain the total (maximised) variability of our sample.1 Furthermore, 
thanks to PCA, or similar dimension reduction techniques such as Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis, we avoid imposing a fixed number of factors to be 
extracted. This is an advantage as compared to Exploratory Factor Analysis. Finally, 
a sufficient number of bivariate correlations between scorecard items are 
statistically significant (two-tailed significance) and sizeable (i.e. above the .3 
threshold), another reason to run a PCA based on the correlation matrix. 
 
                                                          
1   “ ?& ?ĂĐƚŽƌĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĂƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵp [manifest variables] to m dimensions 
by invoking a model relating ݔଵǡ ݔଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݔ௣ to m ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂůŽƌ ůĂƚĞŶƚǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ  ? ? ?WĚŝĨĨĞƌƐ
from factor analysis in having no explicit model ? ? ?:ŽůŝĨĨĞ ?002, p. 151, emphasis in original). 
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We considered the following variables in our PCA: 12 to 42; 56 to 60; 62-104. Total: 
79 variables.2  
 
The literature suggests using either ƚŚĞƐŝŵƉůĞWĞĂƌƐŽŶ ?ƐĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶŵĂƚƌŝǆŽƌ ƚŚĞ
tetrachoric correlation matrix. We rely on the simple correlation matrix. Two 
reasons: first, we found the tetrachoric correlation matrix too difficult to calculate  W 
in terms of computer power, i.e. the solution did not converge. After all, we are 
speaking of a 79x79 correlation matrix across 517 observations. Second, the key 
condition for the use of tetrachoric correlations - latent bivariate normality - is not 
met in our case. As we will explain later below, further diagnostics confirm the 
ǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇŽĨŽƵƌĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞWĞĂƌƐŽŶ ?ƐĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶŵĂƚƌŝǆ ? 
 
In a next step, we chose the most appropriate rotation technique. Rotations may be 
either orthogonal or oblique. Key factors to keep in mind here are the ex-post 
detection of a simple structure and a theoretically supported expectation as to 
whether the extracted components will be correlated or not. We performed two 
rotations, one oblique  ?ŝƌĞĐƚKďůŝŵŝŶ ?ɷA? ? ?ĂŶĚŽŶĞŽƌƚŚŽŐŽŶĂů ?sĂƌŝŵĂǆ ?ǁŝƚŚa 
view to compare the outcomes. Initially, we were slightly more lenient towards an 
orthogonal Varimax rotation because it enabled us to maximize the variance. The 
aim of the PCA is, after all, to describe parsimoniously the key sources of variability 
among our observed variables. The Component Correlation Matrix, a result of the 
Direct Oblimin rotation of the robust PCA iteration (see below), suggested that the 
components were loosely correlated to each other (no correlation above the .3 
                                                          
2   See Table A3 above for our scorecard. 
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threshold), indicating that the oblique solution closely approached orthogonality. 
Furthermore, the results of the Varimax rotation on the robust PCA iteration, 
performed in parallel with the Oblimin rotation, suggested the presence of a simple 
structure underlying our components (see Table A5 below). We therefore decided 
to use the results of the Varimax rotation in subsequent analyses.  
 
In order to ensure the robustness and appropriateness of the PCA, we applied 
several consistency criteria. In a nutshell, we ran three iterations of the PCA: first, 
on the full dataset. Second, on the full dataset but excluding variables with a 
communality below .5. The communality is the share - expressed on 0-1 scale - of 
the variance of each variable that may be explained by the extraction of those 
principal components. If the coefficient was below .5, we removed the variable and 
reran the PCA without it. Third, further excluding variables with a complex 
structure. A complex structure can be observed when a variable shows a significant 
loading - i.e. >0.4 - on more than one component. When we identified such a 
variable, we removed it from the set of manifest variables and reran the PCA 
without it. 
 
When we ran those iterations, we carried out a number of tests in order to check 
for sample adequacy. In iteration 1, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure resulted in a 
value of 0.722, this is larger than the 0.6 usually suggested in the literature. The 
Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant at the 0.01 level. The anti-image 
correlation also confirmed the adequacy of our sample; to this end, we observed 
the coefficients on the diagonal axis of the matrix - they were all >0.5. We then 
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ĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘Communalities ? chart. In line with our criteria for exclusion (see 
above), we removed the variables 24, 83, 86 and 93 and reiterated the analysis 
without them. - In the second iteration, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy and Bartlett's test of sphericity still produced adequate results: 
the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure was 0.723, and Bartlett's test was significant at the 
0.01 level. The anti-image correlation also confirmed the adequacy of our sample. 
The communalities were all >0.5. We therefore proceeded to analyse the loadings 
of variables on the principal components to verify the presence of a simple 
structure. To this end, we looked at the Rotated Component Matrix (rotation 
converged in 28 iterations). Accordingly, the variables 30, 35, 38, 85 and 101 
showed a complex structure, i.e. they have a loading >0.4 on more than one 
component. We therefore ran a third iteration of the PCA without those variables. 
This iteration demonstrated that variable 59 had a communality coefficient slightly 
below .5 (.498), hence we proceeded to a fourth iteration without it. Iteration four 
suggested that variables 29, 70 and 81 have low communalities, we therefore 
removed them and ran fifth PCA iteration. In iteration five all communalities were 
consistent. The Rotated Component Matrix (Table A5) highlighted that no 
component showed a complex structure (rotation converged in 37 iterations). 
Consequently, we relied on this PCA iteration in all subsequent analyses. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure (.704) and Bartlett's test of sphericity (significant at the .01 
level) were adequate, as were the test on the anti-image matrix. 
 
Finally, we performed another test to confirm the consistency of the PCA in its fifth 
iteration: we compared the outcomes of this iteration with those of two 
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randomised validation samples extracted from our database. The results suggest 
that our fifth iteration was consistent with the two validation samples. 
Furthermore, analysing the correlation matrix for multicollinearity would be an 
option in a context of Confirmatory or Exploratory Factor Analysis. However, 
because we are dealing with a PCA based on orthogonal rotation, multicollinearity is 
not an issue. 
 
Let us now have a look at the components. Table A4 below shows the total variance 
explained by the 24 principal components, retained according to the Kaiser 
criterion, i.e. eigenvalue > 1.  
Table A4. Total Variance Explained by principal 
components 
 
Component 
Eigenvalues 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 6.603 9.856 9.856 
2 3.395 5.067 14.922 
3 2.676 3.994 18.916 
4 2.457 3.668 22.584 
5 2.165 3.232 25.816 
6 2.098 3.132 28.948 
7 1.979 2.954 31.902 
8 1.839 2.745 34.647 
9 1.811 2.703 37.350 
10 1.654 2.469 39.819 
11 1.603 2.393 42.212 
12 1.567 2.339 44.551 
13 1.466 2.188 46.739 
14 1.448 2.162 48.901 
15 1.372 2.047 50.948 
16 1.352 2.018 52.966 
17 1.294 1.932 54.897 
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18 1.200 1.791 56.688 
19 1.174 1.753 58.440 
20 1.164 1.738 60.178 
21 1.135 1.694 61.873 
22 1.052 1.570 63.442 
23 1.018 1.519 64.961 
24 1.003 1.497 66.459 
 
Those 24 components explain almost two thirds of the total variance in our sample. 
Please note that each principal component is uncorrelated - i.e. orthogonal - to the 
others. In order to reduce the number of those components, we used a Scree Plot 
graph, identifyinŐ ŶŝŶĞ ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚ ďǇ Ă  ‘ďĞŶĚ ? ?explaining roughly 37.5 
per cent of the total variance (Figure A below). 
 
Figure A1 
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Aiming to increase the explanatory power of the PCA, we decided to abide by the 
ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶŽĨ  “ŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ ? ?A?ŽĨĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ǀĂƌŝĂŶĐĞ ?  ?:ŽůŝĨĨĞ  ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĞ
first 15 components. Those 15 components constitute the basis of our index and are 
the most important sources of variation of our dataset. Table A5 below displays the 
rotated component matrix. It provides evidence that all components have a simple 
structure (i.e. single variables significantly load on one component only). 
 
 
 
 
Table A5. Rotated Component Matrix 
 
The influence of manifest variables on a principal component is measured through 
their loading ĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?  ƐŝŵƉůĞ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ĞŵĞƌŐĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ W ǁŚĞŶ  “ĞĂĐŚ
component has a small number of large loadings and a large number of zero (or 
ƐŵĂůů ?ůŽĂĚŝŶŐƐ ? ?ďĚŝĂŶĚtŝůůŝĂŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƐŝŵƉůĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐĐĂŶďĞ
observed when a subset of conceptually related manifest variables significantly load 
on a single component, thereby confirming that these manifest variables did indeed 
measure the same construct which is now aptly summarized by the component (see 
Table A5 in the appendix). To guarantee robustness and increase interpretability we 
performed a varimax orthogonal rotation of the principal components. 
 
- This table is available upon request from the authors.  - 
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Based on this, Table A6 below provides details about the interpretation we gave to 
the 15 retained components: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A6. Principal components 
 
COMPONENTS 
CUMULATIVE SHARE OF 
EXPLAINED VARIANCE 
LOADING VARIABLES AND COEFFICIENTS                                            
1 Benefit-cost measures 9.856% (9.856%)   
34 Provides range for total costs (.643) 
39 Provides range for total benefits (.816) 
40 Calculates net benefits (.674) 
41 Provides a range for net benefits (.811) 
42 Calculates cost effectiveness (.510) 
2 Cost quantification / 
monetization 
5.067% (14.992%)   
31 Quantifies at least some costs (.822) 
32 Monetizes at least some costs (.897) 
33 Monetizes all or nearly all costs (.657) 
3 Consultation 3.994% (18.916%)   
27 Reports on consultation (.750) 
28 Presents positions expressed by consulted parties 
(.763) 
29 Cooperation between departments (.634) 
4 Impacts on specific 
economic sectors 
3.668% (22.584%)  
67 Discusses whether regulation imposes costs on the 
economic sector (.774) 
73 Discusses whether the economic sector benefits from 
regulation (.773) 
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5 Social impacts 3.232% (25.816%)  
88 Assesses impact on health and safety (.463) 
91 Assesses impact on the social inclusion and protection 
of particular groups (.538) 
92 Assesses impact on equal opportunities, non-
discrimination and gender equality (.737) 
94 Assesses impact on fundamental rights (.720) 
6 Environmental impacts I 3.132% (28.948%)  
95 Assesses impact on renewable or non-renewable 
resources (.668) 
97 Assesses impact on air quality (.642) 
98 Assesses impact on transport and the use of energy 
(.723) 
7 Economic impacts on 
large firms 
2.954% (31.902%)   
68 Discusses whether regulation imposes costs on a few 
large firms (.922) 
74 Discusses whether a few large firms benefit from 
regulation (.924) 
8 Impacts on specific 
categories of citizens 
2.745% (34.647%)  
65 Discusses whether regulation imposes costs on specific 
categories of citizens (.814) 
71 Discusses whether specific categories of citizens benefit 
from regulation (.838) 
9 Environmental impacts II 2.703% (37.350%)   
96 Assesses impact on biodiversity (.606) 
99 Assesses impact on water quality (.769) 
100 Assesses impact on soil quality and resources (.648) 
10 Monitoring and 
implementation 
2.469% (39.819%)   
102 Contains a section on monitoring and evaluation 
(.701) 
103 Mentions a review clause for the proposal (.642) 
104 Contains indicators for evaluation (.576) 
11 Administrative burdens 2.393% (42.212%)  
84 Assesses impact on administrative burdens (.758) 
87 Quantifies administrative burdens for public 
administration (.791) 
12 Impacts on consumers  2.339% (44.551%)  
 
66 Discusses whether regulation imposes costs on 
consumers (.805) 
72 Discusses whether consumers benefit from regulation 
(.823) 
 
13 Macro-economic 
impacts 
2.188% (46.793%)  
76 Assesses impact on competitiveness (.490) 
80 Assesses impact on the common market (.713) 
81 Assesses impact on GDP or other indicators of 
economic growth (.494) 
82 Assesses impact on trade (.629) 
14 Risk-related analyses 
 
2.162% (48.901%)  
56 Carries out a risk assessment (.534) 
57 Carries out a risk-risk analysis (.739) 
58 Considers the precautionary principle (606) 
15 Impacts on non-profit 
sector 
 
2.047% (50.948%)  
69 Discusses whether regulation imposes costs on the 
non-profit sector (.845) 
75 Discusses whether the non-profit sector benefits from 
regulation (.845) 
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Another way to validate the PCA is to control ex post whether the components 
cluster variables that are conceptually measuring the same construct. Indeed, we 
can confidently claim that all components do so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE WEIGHTED INDEXES 
 
In a next step we created an index of IA quality. This is based on the sum of the 
components scores weighted by the share of variance explained by each 
component (see Table A4). The index relies on the 15 components identified above. 
The code reads as follows: 
 ࡹࢇ࢏࢔ࡵ࢔ࢊࢋ࢞࢙ࢉ࢕࢘ࢋ࢏ = (0.193 * FAC1) + (0.099 * FAC2) + (0.078 * FAC3) + (0.072 * 
FAC4) + (0.063 * FAC5) + (0.061 * FAC6) + (0.058 * FAC7) + (0.054 * FAC8) + (0.053 * 
FAC9) + (0.048 * FAC10) + (0.047 * FAC11) + (0.046 * FAC12) + (0.043 * FAC13) + 
(0.042 * FAC14) + (0.04 * FAC15) - whereby FAC stems for the principal component 
score of each observation. 
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The sub-indexes are calculated in the same way. However, they use a subset of 
components for each index (see main text). 
 ૚ሻ࡯࡮࡭ࡵ࢔ࢊࢋ࢞ࡿࢉ࢕࢘ࢋ࢏ = (0.66 * FAC1) + (0.34 * FAC2) ૛ሻࡱࢉ࢕࢔࢕࢓࢏ࢉ࡭࢔ࢇ࢒࢙࢟࢏࢙ࡵ࢔ࢊࢋ࢞࢏ = (0.327 * FAC4) + (0.264 * FAC7) + (0.214 * 
FAC11) + (0.195 * FAC13) ૜ሻࡿ࢕ࢉ࢏ࢇ࢒࡭࢔ࢇ࢒࢙࢟࢏࢙ࡵ࢔ࢊࢋ࢞࢏ = (0.312 * FAC5) + (0.265 * FAC8) + (0.226 * FAC12) + 
(0.197 * FAC15) ૝ሻࡱ࢔࢜࢏࢘࢕࢔࢓ࢋ࢔࢚ࢇ࢒࡭࢔ࢇ࢒࢙࢟࢏࢙ࡵ࢔ࢊࢋ࢞࢏ = (0.537 * FAC6) + (0.463 * FAC9). 
 
Furthermore, we rescaled the indexes to 0-1 values in order to make interpretation 
easier. Finally, we normalized the indexes to meet the distributional assumptions 
for parametric analyses. Specifically, they were transformed in squared root values, 
and a few extremes outliers were manually removed. 
 
As a result, the main index and the sub-indexes 1, 2 and 3 are normally distributed 
according to the analysis of skewness and kurtosis. Sub-index 4, also after squared 
root transformation and the removal of extreme outliers still shows a kurtosis 
above 2, which questions its normality. However, because ANOVA is reasonably 
robust with regards to violations of normality and because of the high explanatory 
value of high scores, we decided not to manipulate the sub-index any further.  
 
Having said this, in order to guarantee robustness and reliability we complemented 
the ANOVA on the environmental sub-index, used to test hypothesis 4, by its non-
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parametric equivalent (Kruskal-Wallis test). Its results are perfectly in line with 
those of the ANOVA (see below, Tables A22 and A23).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
 
 
Table A7. Time trend. Descriptives 
 
IA breadth and scope  
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
2005 82 .55103258 .127049919 .014030316 .52311666 .57894851 .155774 .798699 
2006 93 .55751112 .126746900 .013143041 .53140791 .58361433 .270538 .918428 
2007 73 .59773202 .131070282 .015340616 .56715106 .62831298 .294008 .969195 
2008 96 .58981285 .164477549 .016786920 .55648660 .62313910 .206696 .974378 
2009 78 .61811502 .153792747 .017413600 .58344011 .65278992 .181735 .937545 
2010 56 .58613444 .168007920 .022451003 .54114163 .63112726 .105714 .911107 
2011 37 .65022297 .147072559 .024178580 .60118654 .69925940 .317637 .932817 
Total 515 .58715423 .147378607 .006494277 .57439564 .59991282 .105714 .974378 
 
72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A8. Time trend. ANOVA with polynomial contrast 
 
IA breadth and scope   
 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
(Combined) .420 6 .070 3.306 .003 
Linear Term Unweighted .285 1 .285 13.474 .000 
Weighted .303 1 .303 14.308 .000 
Deviation .117 5 .023 1.106 .356 
Quadratic 
Term 
Unweighted .000 1 .000 .000 .998 
Weighted .002 1 .002 .098 .754 
Deviation .115 4 .029 1.357 .248 
Cubic Term Unweighted .027 1 .027 1.262 .262 
Weighted .011 1 .011 .507 .477 
Deviation .104 3 .035 1.641 .179 
4th-order Unweighted .058 1 .058 2.732 .099 
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Term Weighted .044 1 .044 2.099 .148 
Deviation .060 2 .030 1.412 .245 
5th-order 
Term 
Unweighted .006 1 .006 .306 .581 
Weighted .005 1 .005 .250 .617 
Deviation .054 1 .054 2.573 .109 
Within Groups 10.745 508 .021   
Total 11.164 514    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A9. 2007 guidelines. Group statistics 
 
 @2007_guidelines N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
CBA_ind_sqrt 0 201 .4643995 .14921164 .01052458 
1 284 .5963037 .18410822 .01092481 
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Table A10. 2007 guidelines. Independent samples t-test on sub-index 1 on benefit-
cost measures).  
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Sub-
inde
x 1 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
14.749 .000 -8.39 483 .000 -.1319 .01571833 -.16278889 -.10101940 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-8.69 474.16 .000 -.1319 .01516965 -.16171220 -.10209609 
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Pre-guidelines: 0 
Post-guidelines: 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A11. 2007 Guidelines. Group statistics 
 
 2007_guidelines N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
IA breadth and scope 0 205 .55914457 .123949603 .008657016 
1 288 .60755786 .160457343 .009455040 
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Table A12. 2007 Guidelines. Independent samples t-test on main index. 
 
 
Levene's Test for Equality 
of Variances 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
taile
d) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. 
Error 
Differenc
e 
IA breadth 
and scope 
Equal 
variance
s 
assume
d 
13.783 .000 -3.619 491 .000 -.04841 .01338 
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Equal 
variance
s not 
assume
d 
  
-3.777 
487.6
9 
.000 -.04841 .01282 
 
0 Æ Pre-guidelines 
1 Æ Post-guidelines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A13. Establishment of the Regulatory Policy Committee. Group statistics 
 
 RPC N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
IA breadth and scope 0 403 .58104320 .144960954 .007221019 
1 105 .61245383 .158592576 .015477051 
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Table A14. Establishment of the Regulatory Policy Committee. Independent 
samples t-test on main index. 
 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differen
ce 
Std. 
Error 
Differe
nce 
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IA breadth 
and scope 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.869 .352 -1.939 506 .053 -.03141 .01620 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
-1.839 
152.33
8 
.068 -.03141 .01708 
 
0 Æ Pre-RPC 
1 Æ Post-RPC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A15 Sectoral specialization. Sub-index 2 on economic impacts. Descriptives 
(ANOVA non-significant) 
 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 106 .65229691 .124417902 .012084535 .62833551 .67625831 .342853 .946768 
80 
 
2 79 .64781526 .128069441 .014408938 .61912927 .67650125 .008651 .936701 
3 77 .63274283 .131707617 .015009476 .60284887 .66263679 .267613 .950446 
4 255 .62397365 .138803014 .008692182 .60685573 .64109158 .124585 .999820 
Total 517 .63472990 .133474464 .005870200 .62319747 .64626233 .008651 .999820 
 
 
1 Æ Economic departments 
2 Æ Environmental departments 
3 Æ Social departments 
4 Æ Residual departments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A16. Sectoral specialization. Sub-index 3 on social impacts. Descriptives.  
 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 106 .50240779 .173316986 .016834034 .46902901 .53578657 .027647 .999970 
81 
 
2 79 .49200827 .171822555 .019331548 .45352211 .53049442 .058171 .862675 
3 77 .58493331 .136613664 .015568572 .55392581 .61594081 .265269 .928502 
4 254 .54704141 .151263865 .009491139 .52834970 .56573311 .107586 .949011 
Total 516 .53510128 .159802856 .007034928 .52128059 .54892197 .027647 .999970 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A17. Sectoral specialization. Sub-index 3 on social impacts. ANOVA 
 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .487 3 .162 6.569 .000 
Within Groups 12.664 512 .025   
82 
 
Total 13.152 515    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A18. Sectoral specialization. Sub-index 3 on social impacts. ANOVA multiple 
comparisons 
 
 
(I) Departmental 
specialization 
(J) Departmental 
specialization 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
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Tukey HSD 1 2 .010399517 .023376080 .971 
3 -
.082525522* 
.023549384 .003 
4 -.044633622 .018185856 .069 
2 1 -.010399517 .023376080 .971 
3 -
.092925039* 
.025185797 .001 
4 -
.055033139* 
.020260213 .034 
3 1 .082525522* .023549384 .003 
2 .092925039* .025185797 .001 
4 .037891900 .020459927 .250 
4 1 .044633622 .018185856 .069 
2 .055033139* .020260213 .034 
3 -.037891900 .020459927 .250 
Games-
Howell 
1 2 .010399517 .025633834 .977 
3 -
.082525522* 
.022929569 .002 
4 -.044633622 .019325279 .100 
2 1 -.010399517 .025633834 .977 
3 -
.092925039* 
.024821144 .001 
4 -.055033139 .021535795 .057 
3 1 .082525522* .022929569 .002 
2 .092925039* .024821144 .001 
4 .037891900 .018233545 .165 
4 1 .044633622 .019325279 .100 
2 .055033139 .021535795 .057 
3 -.037891900 .018233545 .165 
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Table A19. Sectoral specialization. Sub-index 4 on environmental impacts. 
Descriptives.  
 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 105 .40183253 .088776352 .008663685 .38465212 .41901294 .249822 .773183 
2 79 .51899383 .130724719 .014707680 .48971309 .54827457 .294870 .815718 
3 77 .42322231 .089518414 .010201570 .40290412 .44354050 .143397 .672229 
4 255 .44219374 .135810512 .008504784 .42544487 .45894262 .134219 1.000016 
Total 516 .44290785 .125496906 .005524693 .43205414 .45376156 .134219 1.000016 
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Table A20. Sectoral specialization. Sub-index 4 on environmental impacts. ANOVA 
 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .664 3 .221 15.229 .000 
Within Groups 7.447 512 .015   
Total 8.111 515    
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Table A21. Sectoral specialization. Sub-index 4 on environmental impacts. ANOVA 
multiple comparisons 
 
 
(I) Departmental 
specialization 
(J) Departmental 
specialization 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
 
Tukey HSD 1 2 -
.117161301* 
.017961491 .000 
3 -.021389784 .018094115 .638 
4 -
.040361215* 
.013983895 .021 
2 1 .117161301* .017961491 .000 
3 .095771518* .019312791 .000 
4 .076800086* .015528563 .000 
3 1 .021389784 .018094115 .638 
2 -
.095771518* 
.019312791 .000 
4 -.018971432 .015681776 .621 
4 1 .040361215* .013983895 .021 
2 -
.076800086* 
.015528563 .000 
3 .018971432 .015681776 .621 
Games-
Howell 
1 2 -
.117161301* 
.017069718 .000 
3 -.021389784 .013384000 .383 
4 -
.040361215* 
.012140461 .005 
2 1 .117161301* .017069718 .000 
3 .095771518* .017899382 .000 
4 .076800086* .016989620 .000 
3 1 .021389784 .013384000 .383 
2 -
.095771518* 
.017899382 .000 
4 -.018971432 .013281694 .483 
4 1 .040361215* .012140461 .005 
2 -
.076800086* 
.016989620 .000 
3 .018971432 .013281694 .483 
 
87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A22. Sectorial specialization. Sub-index 4 on environmental impacts.. Mean 
Ranks 
 
  
Departmental 
specialization 
N Mean Rank 
Environmental 
sub-index 
1 105 199.39 
2 79 350.30 
3 77 250.29 
4 255 256.88 
Total 516   
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Table A23. Sectorial specialization. Sub-index 4 on environmental impacts. Non-
parametric test, Kruskal-Wallis  
 
  
Environmental sub-
index 
Chi-Square 46.718 
df 3 
Asymp. Sig. .000 
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Table A24. Core executive. Main index. Descriptives 
 
IA breadth and scope 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
0 309 .60160195 .147229171 .008375575 .58512137 .61808254 .105714 .974378 
1 132 .56048134 .148316839 .012909324 .53494362 .58601906 .181735 .937545 
2 74 .57440387 .140244884 .016303137 .54191177 .60689598 .313544 .937113 
Total 515 .58715423 .147378607 .006494277 .57439564 .59991282 .105714 .974378 
 
0 Æ Non-core departments  
1 Æ Core departments 
2 Æ Super-core departments 
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Table A25. Core executive. ANOVA on main index 
 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .170 2 .085 3.969 .019 
Within Groups 10.994 512 .021   
Total 11.164 514    
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Table A26. Core executive. ANOVA multiple comparisons 
 
 
(I) Department type (J) Department type Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.  
Tukey HSD 0 1 .041120612* .015236789 .020 
2 .027198081 .018964643 .324 
1 0 -.041120612* .015236789 .020 
2 -.013922531 .021279977 .790 
2 0 -.027198081 .018964643 .324 
1 .013922531 .021279977 .790 
Games-Howell 0 1 .041120612* .015388336 .022 
2 .027198081 .018328735 .302 
1 0 -.041120612* .015388336 .022 
2 -.013922531 .020795262 .782 
2 0 -.027198081 .018328735 .302 
1 .013922531 .020795262 .782 
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Table A27. Factorial ANOVA, interaction between year of publication and 2007 
guidelines 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   RIA analytical richness   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .458a 8 .057 2.679 .007 .042 
Intercept 28.363 1 28.363 1326.861 .000 .733 
Year_of_publication .156 6 .026 1.220 .295 .015 
@2007_guidelines 1.538E-5 1 1.538E-5 .001 .979 .000 
Year_of_publication * 
@2007_guidelines 
.009 1 .009 .419 .518 .001 
Error 10.346 484 .021    
Total 180.924 493     
Corrected Total 10.804 492     
a. R Squared = .042 (Adjusted R Squared = .027) 
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Table A28. Factorial ANOVA, interaction between year of publication and 
establishment of the RPC 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   RIA analytical richness   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .441a 7 .063 2.942 .005 .040 
Intercept 103.426 1 103.426 4830.932 .000 .906 
Year_of_publication .359 6 .060 2.793 .011 .032 
Dummy_RPC .000 1 .000 .017 .895 .000 
Year_of_publication * 
Dummy_RPC 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error 10.705 500 .021    
Total 186.506 508     
Corrected Total 11.145 507     
a. R Squared = .040 (Adjusted R Squared = .026) 
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Table A29. One-way ANOVA of main index using sectoral specialization as grouping 
variable. Descriptives. 
 
RIA analytical richness   
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
1 -  104 .57570287 .143503793 .014071705 
2 79 .61211071 .147911598 .016641355 
3 77 .58843061 .146958206 .016747442 
4 255 .58370755 .148872159 .009322736 
Total 515 .58715423 .147378607 .006494277 
Model Fixed Effects   .147373066 .006494033 
Random Effects    .006556061 
 
1 Æ Economic departments 
2 Æ Environmental departments 
3 Æ Social departments 
4 Æ Residual departments 
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Table A30. ANOVA of main index using sectoral specialization as grouping variable. 
RIA analytical richness   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .066 3 .022 1.013 .387 
Within Groups 11.098 511 .022   
Total 11.164 514    
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Table A31. The 2007 IA guidelines across departments 
Typology of 
department 
Number of pre-
guidelines IAs 
Number of 
post-guidelines 
IAs 
Sub-index 1 
mean pre-
guidelines 
Sub-index 1 
mean post-
guidelines 
Economic 
departments 
54 48 0.466 0.626* 
Environmental 
departments 
32 42 0.457 0.617* 
Social 
departments 
38 38 0.488 0.573* 
Residual 
departments 
77 156 0.454 0.587* 
The asterisk indicates statistically significant differences (p<.05) in the t-test for equality of 
means. The improvement of sub-index 1 after the 2007 guidelines is homogeneous across 
departments.  
 
                                                          
i  See Table A1 in our supplementary materials for a list of all UK departments including their 
abbreviated versions and Table A2 for an overview of our sample. 
ii  See Table A3 in in our supplementary materials for our scorecard. 
iii  See pages 7 to 16 in our supplementary materials for an in-depth discussion of how we 
conducted the PCA and, based on the PCA, constructed our dependent variables. 
iv      See Table A6 in our supplementary materials for further details on the principal components and 
their loading variables and coefficients. 
v  Tables A7 and A8 in our supplementary materials provide additional materials. 
vi     We wish to emphasize that we carried out two ANOVAs on the main index: one employing 
polynomial contrasts and another one using planned contrasts. Both ANOVAs are based on a 
comparison of the same marginal means. While the first ANOVA analyzes the trend of the main 
index over time including its shape and is used to test Hypothesis 1, the second ANOVA 
specifically contrasts the means of pre-electoral, electoral and post-electoral years and their 
statistically significant differences to test Hypothesis 4.  
vii      One-ǁĂǇEKs ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞƉA? ? ? ? ? Wone-tailed. 
viii  Environmental departments perform significantly richer environmental analyses than economic 
(p<.01  W Games-Howell pot-ŚŽĐƚĞƐƚ ?ŽŚĞŶ ?ƐĚA? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƉAM ? ? ? WGames-
Howell post-ŚŽĐƚĞƐƚ ?ŽŚĞŶ ?ƐĚA? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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ix  According to the post-hoc multiple comparisons, social departments significantly outperform 
economic (p<.01  W Tukey HSD post-ŚŽĐ ƚĞƐƚ ? ŽŚĞŶ ?Ɛ ĚA? ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂů  ?ƉAM ? ? ?  W 
Tukey HSD post-ŚŽĐƚĞƐƚ ?ŽŚĞŶ ?ƐĚA? ? ? ? ? ?) departments when it comes to the analysis of social 
impacts. 
x  In particular: Peripheral vs. Core departments (p=.02  W Tukey HSD post-ŚŽĐ ƚĞƐƚ ? ŽŚĞŶ ?Ɛ
d=.285). 
xi  WůĞĂƐĞŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ/ƐƵƐĞĚƉĞƌĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂů ‘ƐƚĂĐŬ ?ŵĂǇďĞƐůŝŐŚƚůǇůŽǁĞƌƚŚan the 
figures provided in the additional materials for the total number of IA per department. This is 
because at times IAs came with no precise publication date. We possess information on the 
publication year but do not know the day and month, making it impossible to integrate such an 
/ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůůǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂů ‘ƐƚĂĐŬ ? ?
xii  Both DFES and DIUS had a strong focus on innovation, skills and the commercial exploitation of 
scientific achievements with a view to facilitating economic growth. Unsurprisingly, they were 
later collapsed with BERR to form BIS. 
